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INTERPRETING THE HEIGHTENED PLEADING OF THE
SCIENTER REQUIREMENT IN PRIVATE SECURITIES FRAUD
LITIGATION: THE TENTH CIRCUIT TAKES THE MIDDLE
GROUND
INRODUCTION
You can't get discovery unless you have strong evidence of fraud,
and you can't get strong evidence offraud without discovery. 
1
Recent revelations of corporate and individual malfeasance, fraud,
and accounting irregularities2 suggest that Congress may revisit, and
possibly revise,3 certain provisions of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"). 4 While private securities litigation ac-
tions augment the enforcement activities of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"),5 critics of private securities actions claim that the
threat of strike suits6 creates enormous, unfair burdens on targeted com-
panies. 7 Congress enacted the PSLRA, in large part, to rein in what it, as
1. Robert S. Greenberger, Questioning the Books: Panel, in Enron 's Wake, to Review Law-
suit Curbs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2002, at A8 (quoting Columbia University law professor Jack
Coffee).
2. See Eugene Spector, Fraud Made Easy, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 23, 2002, at A17 ("The equity
bubble has burst, revealing vast accounting fraud, falsified profits, inflated assets and shyster execu-
tives the likes of which this country has rarely seen"); see also Carl M. Cannon, Letterfrom Wash-
ington; Suits vs. Suits. Learning to Love Those "Legal Leeches," FORBES, Oct. 7, 2002, at 18 ("[A]
few of us ... warned that underneath this veneer of prosperity and profit actually lay widespread
accounting rot, falsified profits, inflated asset values, and executive chicanery which would collapse
the system" (quoting from an address that securities litigator William S. Lerach gave at Stanford
Law School)), available at 2002 WL 23192442.
3. See Spector, supra note 2 (arguing for repeal of the Private Securities litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (PSLRA)). But see Charles H. Dick, Jr., Going Overboard on Securities Law Reform,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 19, 2002, at B7 (arguing that additional legislation is unnecessary and
will impose economic burdens on "America's honest businesses"), available at 2002 WL 4615199;
Patricia J. Villareal, Enron's Impact on the PSLRA, TEx. LAW., Apr. 29, 2002, at 31 (arguing that
even with the many Enron-inspired bills before it, Congress should not change the PSLRA). Con-
gress responded to public outcries in the wake of the collapse of Enron by enacting the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). See Barton S. Sacher et al., The Public Company Accounting
Reform and Protection Act, The Changing Landscape of Public Corporations and the Accounting
and Law Firms who Provide Them Services, FLA. B. NEWS, Sept. 1, 2002, at 24, for a discussion of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's provisions. "The new law is designed to crack down on corporate crimi-
nals and to help restore confidence in the honesty, integrity, and fundamental strength of the Ameri-
can economy and.., marketplace." Id.
4. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
5. See Spector, supra note 2 ("Securities litigation is a powerful deterrent against corporate
fraud."); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
6. The term "strike suit" is defined as "a suit (esp. a derivative action), often based on no
valid claim, brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settle-
ment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (7th ed. 1999).
7. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31-32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-31.
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well as many members of the business and legal communities, believed
to be abusive or unfounded securities lawsuits.
In order to protect defendants from the costs associated with frivo-
lous suits, the PSLRA halts any discovery during the pendency of a mo-
tion to dismiss.9 To survive such a motion, the PSLRA places plaintiffs
in the unenviable position of having to present a very strong and compel-
ling case at the pleading stage, without the benefit of discovery.10 On the
other hand, the PSLRA arguably provides corporations and other defen-
dants with better protection from "vexatious litigation""I because a mo-
tion to dismiss will likely defeat a weak or poorly pled case.
During the survey period, September 2001 to August 2002, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in City of Philadel-
phia v. Fleming Cos., 12 interpreted the PSLRA's new "strong inference"
standard for pleading scienter 13 under the anti-fraud provisions.' 4 The
Tenth Circuit's holding in Fleming is significant. In a well-reasoned and
common sense analysis, the court aligned itself with other "middle
ground" circuits when it held that, in the Tenth Circuit, courts will apply
a "totality of the pleadings" test. 15 A plaintiff must show that the defen-
dant possessed information, the intentional or reckless nondisclosure of
which likely misled investors. 16 Motive and opportunity to commit fraud
are relevant to proving scienter, but not sufficient alone. 17 The court will
examine the plaintiff's allegations in their entirety to determine whether,
8. Id. at 32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731. Among the abuses noted by Congress
were: 1) strike suits; 2) targeting "deep pocket" defendants; 3) abuse of discovery to try to force
settlement; 4) filing of "cookie-cutter" lawsuits whenever a company's share price dropped; and 5)
attorney manipulation of clients in class action suits. Id. at 31, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
731; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-44 (1975) (discussing
"vexatious litigation" under SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2003)).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2000). Unless a stay would create "undue prejudice," or the
plaintiffs can convince the court that "particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence,"
the filing of a motion to dismiss automatically stays "all discovery and other proceedings." Id.; see
also Dan Camey, Why the Little Guy Can't Win, Bus. WK., Oct. 14, 2002, at 132 (noting that three
months prior to WorldCom, Inc.'s disclosure of accounting irregularities, a Mississippi federal judge
dismissed a fraud class action against the company, and that a court dismissed thirty-eight suits
against Tyco International, Ltd. in February of 2002).
10. But see, e.g., Alan R. Friedman & Michael Tremonte, Halting Discovery in Securities
Cases Rulings Explore Potential Exceptions to Mandatory Stays Under the Reform Act, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 15, 2002 (exploring recent decisions interpreting the PSLRA stay provision).
11. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740.
12. 264 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2001). In addition to Fleming, the focus of this article, the Tenth
Circuit also addressed certain aspects of materiality and the duty to disclose in McDonald v. Kinder-
Morgan, Inc., 287 F.3d 992 (10th Cir. 2002).
13. The word "scienter" is defined as "a degree of knowledge that makes a person legally
responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1347
(7th ed. 1999). Scienter in the context of securities fraud includes a requirement that the act was
intentional. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) (defining scienter in the
securities fraud context as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud").
14. See Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1248-49.
15. Id. at 1261-62.
16. Id. at 1261.
17. Id. at 1263.
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taken as a whole, the pleadings "give rise to a strong inference of sci-
enter."'
18
This survey focuses on the Tenth Circuit's "middle ground" analy-
sis of the scienter pleading requirement of the PSLRA. Part I gives a
brief history of securities law prior to the enactment of the PSLRA and
the subsequent apparent split among the United States courts of appeals
in the way that courts in different circuits implement the scienter plead-
ing requirement. Part II presents the Tenth Circuit's decision in Fleming
and discusses Fleming's impact as evidenced by two current district
court cases decided in the Tenth Circuit. Part 111 reviews selected recent
cases from other circuits. Part IV compares the Tenth Circuit's analysis
with the analyses of the other circuits. The Tenth Circuit's "middle
ground" approach appears to represent an emerging consensus for all of
the circuits, diminishing the significance of the previous "circuit split."
1. BACKGROUND
A. The Securities Acts
Congress enacted the securities laws 19 in response to the market
crash of 1929 and the Great Depression.2 ° Collapsed share prices and
disclosures of fraud and stock price manipulations seriously eroded in-
vestor confidence.2' Congress sought to restore faith in the exchanges,
thereby stimulating wealth formation, creating jobs, and enhancing eco-
22nomic growth. The Securities Act of 1933 regulated the registration and
offering of securities and imposed civil and criminal penalties for viola-
tions. 23 In addition, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulated sec-
ondary trading, and instituted reporting requirements for corporations
listing stock on the national exchanges and the over-the-counter mar-
kets.2
The Exchange Act contained strong prohibitions on fraud. Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act made it "unlawful for any person... [t]o use
18. Id.
19. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
77a-77aa); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78a-78mm).
20. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976) (discussing the rationale
behind federal securities regulation). See generally Janine C. Guido, Seeking Enlightenment from
Above: Circuit Courts Split on the Interpretation of the Reform Act's Heightened Pleading Require-
ment, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 501, 503-13 (2000) (providing historical and legislative background of
securities law).
21. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194-95.
22. See, e.g., JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE ch. 2 (rev. ed. 1995)
(discussing the rationale for the Securities Act of 1933).
23. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195; see also 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2[3][A] (4th ed. 2002).
24. See 2 HAZEN, supra note 23, § 9.2. Section 12g, which covers over-the-counter markets,
was added to the Exchange Act in 1964. See id. at n.8.
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or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security...
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
[the rules prescribed by the SEC].25 The SEC implemented this prohibi-
tion in Rule lOb-5, making it unlawful to disseminate untrue statements
of material fact, or to fail to disclose material facts, if, by so doing, inves-
26tors might be misled as to the value of a company's stock. Even though
§ 10(b) does not explicitly create any private right of action (nor did the
SEC or Congress necessarily intend such a remedy), 7 the courts have
determined that litigants may pursue a private right of action when they
allege that they have been the victims of securities fraud.
28
B. Standard for Pleading Prior to the PSRLA
Courts adopted a wide variety of interpretations of the substantive
and procedural foundations of actions under Rule lOb-5.29 In order to
bring a Rule lOb-5 or § 10(b) action in the Tenth Circuit, "a plaintiff
[had to] allege: (1) a misleading statement or omission of a material fact;
(2) made in connection with the purchase or sale of securities; (3) with
intent to defraud or recklessness; (4) reliance; and (5) damages.,, 30 The
pleading of the third element, intent, has engendered much controversy.
The Supreme Court defined scienter in the securities fraud context as "a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.' 1 Al-
though this definition covered intentional behavior, the Court did not
specifically address whether scienter also included recklessness.32 All of
the circuit courts, however, accepted a showing of recklessness to sup-
port scienter.33
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
26. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
27. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196.
28. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
29. Compare Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (2d Cir. 1994), and In
re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 269 (2d Cir. 1993), with In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
42 F.3d 1541, 1545-47 (9th Cir. 1994), and Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 284-85 (3d
Cir. 1992). See also S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683
("The lack of congressional involvement has left judges free to develop conflicting legal stan-
dards.").
30. Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir. 1997) (govemed by pre-PSLRA
law). To survive either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment a plaintiff had to
allege facts that supported these five elements. See Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1118.
31. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n. 12.
32. Id. at 193. The Court disallowed negligence as a basis for liability. See id.
33. Scott H. Moss, Comment, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: The Scienter
Debacle, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 1279, 1280 (2000). The Tenth Circuit defined recklessness as
"conduct that is an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a
danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the
actor must have been aware of it." City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos. 264 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th
Cir. 2001) (quoting Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1232 (10th Cir. 1996)). This is
also the Seventh Circuit articulation of recklessness, see Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553
F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977), and it is used by the majority of circuit courts, see Fleming, 264
F.3d at 1259.
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Prior to the PSLRA, the circuits divided over the degree of factual
support needed in the pleadings to support allegations of scienter.34 The
Ninth Circuit employed a lenient pleading standard.35 In contrast, the
Second Circuit, considered the most stringent, required plaintiffs to pro-
vide a "strong inference" of scienter by either (1) sufficiently alleging
facts showing "strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior
or recklessness," or (2) alleging facts sufficient to infer the defendant's
36opportunity and motive to commit securities fraud.
C. New Pleading Standard After Passage of the PSLRA and the Circuit
"Split"
Reacting to this lack of uniformity in the circuits' application of
Rule 9(b), and in response to the intense criticism by participants in the
industry and others regarding perceived abuse by litigants of § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5, Congress revised the securities laws by passing the
PSLRA.3 7 The PSLRA did a number of things. The more important
changes included the addition of statutory "safe harbor" provisions;
38
substitution of proportionate liability for joint and several liability in
cases where the defendants acted non-knowingly; 39 as well as various
provisions governing lead plaintiffs and counsel in class action suits.
40
In addition, the PSLRA included a new, heightened, statutory plead-
ing requirement regarding a defendant's state of mind.4' Specifically,
34. See generally Note, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims with Particularity Under Rule 9(b),
97 HARV. L. REV. 1432 (1984) (discussing the courts' inability to "resolve the conflict between the
philosophy of notice pleading... and the heightened pleading standard of rule 9(b).").
35. See, e.g., GlenFed, Inc., 42 F.3d at 1545-47. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires
plaintiffs to plead the factual circumstances surrounding any alleged fraud with particularity in order
to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See id. at 1545. "[Rule] 9(b)... states, 'In all averments of
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.
Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally."' Id.
(quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b)). Because Rule 9(b) only requires general allegations of intent, "[in
the Tenth Circuit, [such] general averments of intent or other conditions of mind, unaccompanied by
supporting facts, [were] adequate" to satisfy the particularity requirement. In re Storage Tech. Corp.
Sec. Litig., 804 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (D. Colo. 1992) (citing Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886
F.2d 1262, 1270 n.5 (10th Cir. 1989)); see also In re Stat-Tech Sec. Litig., 905 F. Supp. 1416, 1421
(D. Colo. 1995); In re Exabyte Corp. Sec. Litig., 823 F. Supp. 866, 869 (D. Colo. 1993).
36. Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing the
Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA pleading standard).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
Congress enacted the PSLRA over President Clinton's veto. Dick, supra note 3.
38. The PSLRA added section 27A to the 1933 Act and section 21E to the 1934 Act, which
codified the "bespeaks caution" doctrine whereby "sufficient cautionary language may preclude
misstatements from being actionable." 2 HAZEN, supra note 23, § 12.9[8].
39. See id. § 7.1211].
40. See id. § 12.15[1][A]-[B].
41. See Brent Wilson, Comment, Pleading Versus Proving Scienter Under the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995 in the Ninth Circuit After In re Silicon Graphics and Howard v.
Everex: Meet the Pleading Standard and the Fat Lady has Already Sung, 38 WILLAMETrE L. REV.
321, 324-25 (2002). See generally Moss, supra note 33 ("[Alnalyzing the various interpretations of
the PSLRA's scienter standard.").
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Congress attempted in the PSLRA to insure a uniform and heightened
42pleading standard, requiring that:
[iln any private action arising under this title ... in which the
plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defen-
dant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with
respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this title ... , state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the de-
fendant acted with the required state of mind.
43
Should the plaintiff fail to satisfy this requirement, the court may dismiss
her claim."a
The PSLRA neither defined "required state of mind' 45 nor pre-
scribed any particular method for showing a strong inference of sci-
46enter. The legislative history does not clearly indicate what Congress
47 48intended.47 Congress declined to enunciate an unambiguous standard.
Unfortunately, contrary to Congress' intent, passage of the Reform Act
has not significantly affected the number of securities fraud cases filed
each year.49 Its enactment fueled a firestorm of litigation to resolve vari-
ous ambiguities in the statute and clarify many of the Act's procedural
requirements. 50 In particular, the circuits have struggled in the seven
42. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,740 (Rule 9(b) "ha[d]
not prevented abuse of the securities laws by private litigants.").
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
44. Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A).
45. See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999).
46. See Nathenson v. Zonagen, 267 F.3d 400, 411 (5th Cir. 2001).
47. See, e.g., Greebel v. FIP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195 (1st Cir. 1999) ("The legisla-
tive history is inconclusive on whether the Act was meant to either embody or to reject the Second
Circuit's pleading standards.").
48. Greebel, 194 F.3d at 192 ("[A]II sides find ... some support for their positions....
[Tihere was agreement [in Congress] on the words of the statute and little else."). The PSLRA
explicitly uses the Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA language of "strong inference;" however, the Con-
ference Committee stated that it did not intend to "codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting
this pleading standard." H.R. REP. No.104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
740.
49. Since Congress passed the PSLRA, over 1,700 class action securities fraud cases have
been filed in federal district courts. See Stanford Law School & Cornerstone Research, Securities
Class Action Clearinghouse, at http://securities.stanford.edu (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter
Class Action Litigation] (showing 1,703 federal cases since 1996). Of the roughly 1,300 shareholder
class action suits filed between December of 1995 and May of 2002, approximately one-fourth were
dismissed, with another one-fourth settled. Kevin P. Roddy, Seven Years of Practice and Procedure
Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, SH013 AI-ABA 397, 499, 502 (2002).
In the five years preceding the enactment of the PSLRA, approximately 200 cases per year were
filed. See Class Action Litigation, supra. The dollar amount of settlement has greatly increased over
the years, averaging $16 million in 2001. See Stanford Law School & Cornerstone Research, Federal
Securities Class Action Cases Filed and Defendant Market Cap Losses Surge in 2001 (Mar. 15,2002),
at http://securities.stanford.edu/scac-press/20020315 CR -SCAC.pdf.
50. See Roddy, supra note 49, at 405 ("[lIt cannot be disputed that since [the PSLRA was
passed] the procedural skirmishing ... has been more intense and time-consuming than that experi-
enced under the prior statutory scheme").
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years since the passage of the PSLRA with the interpretation and appli-
cation of the heightened pleading standard.5
Three potentially divergent approaches arose as to exactly what a
plaintiff must allege in order to support a "strong inference" of scienter.52
Courts generally agree that recklessness will suffice.5 3 The basic dis-
agreement concerns whether a showing of motive and opportunity by
itself remains sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirements of the
PSLRA.
1. The Second Circuit's Motive and Opportunity Test
The Second and Third Circuits have held that a showing of motive
and opportunity remains sufficient to prove scienter after the passage of
the PSLRA.54 Motive entails a showing of "concrete benefits that could
be realized by one or more ... false statements. ' 5 Opportunity requires
pleading facts showing "the means and likely prospect of achieving con-
crete benefits by the means alleged. 56 In other words, the defendants
must have had the ability to profit from the alleged fraud.
The Third Circuit, in In re Advanta Corp. Securities Litigation,57
reviewed both the legislative history and the plain language of the
PSLRA.58 After finding the legislative history contradictory and incon-
clusive, the court held that to plead scienter sufficiently, plaintiffs need
51. Cf Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1257-63 (discussing the circuit court split over the pleading
standard). See generally Moss, supra note 33 (discussing the courts' varying interpretations of the
PSLRA's effect on the scienter pleading requirements).
52. See Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1259-63; see also Dale E. Barnes, Jr. & Elizabeth Ybarra, Test-
ing a Complaint Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 1320 PLI CORP. 135 (2002);
Lewis J. Liman, Selected Topics Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA),
Pleading Scienter, Pleading Particularity (Anonymous Sources) and Document Preservation, 1320
PLI CORP. 35, 37-40 (2002); Moss, supra note 33; Roddy, supra note 49, at 435-57; Tower C.
Snow, Jr. & Stephen M. Knaster, The Diverging Circuit Court Standards for Pleading Scienter
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 1332 PLI CORP. 261 (2002).
53. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, "Wharf," the Reform Act and Scienter, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 26,
2001, at 3 ("[A]II of the circuits have gleaned the idea that recklessness can constitute the necessary
intent to violate § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5"); see also In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525,
535 (3d Cir. 1999) (reaffirming that recklessness "remains a sufficient basis for liability"). This
might not be true in the Ninth Circuit. See discussion infra Part IV.
54. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000) (reaffirming that previous Second
Circuit case law remains the standard by which scienter must be pled); Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534-35;
Press, 166 F.3d at 537-38.
55. Shields, 25 F.3d at 1130.
56. Id.
57. 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999). Advanta, a credit card issuer, used aggressive "teaser rates"
to attract new customers, and would, after a limited time, raise the cards' interest rate to a higher,
permanent level. Advanta, 180 F.3d at 528. Investors alleged the company and its officers knowingly
made false and misleading statements and omissions regarding the company's earnings potential and
stock value. Id. The Circuit Court dismissed the complaint because it determined that several state-
ments were "forward-looking" within the safe harbor provision of the PSLRA; that the plaintiffs had
failed to plead specific facts supporting an inference that the company had actual knowledge of its
statements' falsity; and that optimistic statements characterized as "puffery" are generally not mate-
rial. See id. at 535-36, 538. According to the court, stock sales by some officers did not rise to the
level permitting an inference of fraudulent intent. See id. at 540-41.
58. Id. at 531.
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only allege facts establishing a motive and opportunity to commit fraud
or "facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of either reckless or con-
scious behavior., 59 The court emphasized, however, that plaintiffs must
support such allegations with particular facts allowing a strong inference
of scienter.6
2. The Ninth Circuit: In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litiga-
tion 61
The Ninth Circuit held that allegations of "mere 'motive and oppor-
tunity' or 'recklessness"' fail to meet the PSLRA's heightened pleading
standard, stating that "the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead, at a mini-
mum, particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate or
conscious recklessness."62 The Ninth Circuit's pronouncement of an ap-
parently new recklessness standard, "deliberate recklessness," elicited
much criticism; however, its actual application has been comparable to
63the recklessness standards of the other circuits.
3. Other Circuits: Emergence of "The Middle Ground"
64
The First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that while allega-
tions of motive and opportunity alone will not meet the scienter require-
ment, the courts will consider these allegations relevant to the scienter
analysis when based upon supporting facts. 65 In re Comshare, Inc. Secu-
rities Litigation66 illustrates this principle. In that case, the plaintiffs al-
leged that -they were induced to purchase Comshare stock at an artifi-
cially inflated price by the defendants' public misrepresentations of
revenue, which resulted from a knowing or reckless disregard of ac-
67counting errors. Plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants violated
"Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ('GAAP')," as well as the
company's established accounting standards, because they claimed that
Comshare prematurely recognized revenue based upon conditional
68sales. The Sixth Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs' allegations that theemployment compensation of individual defendants were tied to the
59. See id. at 534-35.
60. Id. at 535.
61. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
62. Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979 (emphasis added).
63. See discussion infra Part I.B.
64. Besides the First, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits should
likely also be considered "middle ground." See infra Parts IM., IV.
65. See Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 550, 552 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (reaffirming
the proposition that the PSLRA requires particularized pleadings that raise a "strong inference of
scienter"), cert. dismissed, 536 U.S. 935 (2002); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1285-
87 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding that "severe recklessness" satisfies the scienter requirement and requir-
ing plaintiffs to plead scienter with particularity); Greebel, 194 F.3d at 188 (holding that the PSLRA
requires particularized pleadings that "raise a 'strong' inference of scienter").
66. 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999).




price of the company's stock and that individual defendants benefited by
selling personally held stock at the inflated prices provided the motive
and opportunity of the defendants to commit fraud.69 The court, however,
held that, without more, this did not give rise to a strong inference that
the defendants acted with recklessness. 70 Because the complaint did not
allege any facts that showed that the defendants knew, or could of
known, of the accounting errors, the court held that a mere "failure to
follow GAAP," even if knowing or reckless, could not alone support
scienter.71
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with what it viewed as the Sixth Cir-
cuit's position in Comshare; specifically, that pleading motive and op-
portunity could not alone sustain a complaint of fraud.72 The Sixth Cir-
cuit, however, in a later case, stated that the Eleventh Circuit's "reading
of Comshare [was] unduly rigid" and that "[w]hile it is true that motive
and opportunity are not substitutes for a showing of recklessness, they
can be catalysts to fraud and so serve as external markers to the required
state of mind., 73 The Sixth Circuit reiterated that plaintiffs must plead
74
facts and not rely on the "mantra" of motive and opportunity. Assertin
that "Congress was concerned with the quantum, not type, of proof,"W
the Sixth Circuit went on to endorse the First Circuit's "fact-specific"
approach, whereby "inferences of scienter survive a motion to dismiss
only if they are both reasonable and strong inferences. 76 In order to cre-
ate a strong inference, plaintiffs must propose facts that most plausibly
support a conclusion that misconduct occurred in the face of competing
inferences. 77 Thus, according to the Sixth Circuit, the PSLRA signifi-
cantly strengthened the prior standard, which had given plaintiffs "the
benefit of all reasonable inferences. 78
Against this backdrop of confusion about implementing the new
PSLRA pleading requirements, the Tenth Circuit weighed in.
69. Id. at 553.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283.
73. Helwig, 251 F.3d. at 550.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 551.
76. Id. (quoting Greebel, 194 F.3d at 195-96).
77. See id.
78. Id. at 553 (quoting Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264, 270 (6th Cir. 1994)).
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II. PLEADING SCIENTER IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
A. City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos.
7 9
1. Facts
Plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of
Fleming Companies, Inc. ("Fleming") stock.80 The plaintiffs alleged that
defendant Fleming and four current or former executives of the company
violated federal securities laws by issuing materially misleading state-
ments and omitting material information in filings with the SEC and in
81communications with investors.
Fleming, a publicly traded company, specialized in the food distri-
bution business and supplied food to more than 10,000 supermarkets and
retail food stores. 2 In addition, Fleming owned and operated approxi-
mately 335 supermarkets.8 3 Fleming's pricing arrangements included a
"cost-plus" contract under which Fleming purportedly charged customers
its actual cost for the items it supplied plus an agreed percentage
markup.8 Customers could expect to receive lower prices through this
arrangement due to Fleming's volume discounts from its own suppliers.85
David's Supermarkets, Inc. ("David's"), a chain of Texas grocery stores,
filed suit against Fleming in August 1993, alleging that, contrary to the
companies' "cost-plus" contract, Fleming kept for itself the incentives86
and other discounts given by its suppliers. David's sought damages of
approximately $110 million, an amount it eventually raised to almost
$450 million.87 In 1993 and 1994, $110 million represented approxi-
mately 10% of Fleming's total net worth and about 3% of its total as-
sets.88
Fleming did not disclose the lawsuit until March 14, 1996, when it
filed its 1995 Annual Report, the same day the jury announced its "ver-
79. 264 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2001).
80. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1248-49.
81. Id. For the purposes of § 10b and Rule lOb-5, materiality is established by showing "a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider [the information] important."
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (adopting the materiality standard defined for
proxy-solicitation issues in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). To be
materially misleading, the statement or information must be significantly inaccurate or obfuscating.
See 2 HAZEN, supra note 23, § 12.9.
82. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1249.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1250.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1250-51.
88. Id. at 1250. The court found troubling the fact that it could not ascertain from the facts
given in the Fleming pleadings what percentage of Fleming's total net worth or total assets was
represented by the later, amended damage claims. See id. at 1251, 1266. The court's decision about
whether to consider the David's litigation material was based in part on these percentages. See infra
text accompanying notes 105, 115.
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dict of liability against Fleming. '' 89 Following this disclosure, Fleming's
stock suffered a substantial drop in value.9° Even though the court set
aside the verdict for David's in May 1996 and Fleming eventually settled
the dispute for approximately $20 million, the plaintiffs in the instant
case alleged that Fleming's stock price never recovered.9' The plaintiffs
alleged (1) that the individual defendants, as senior officers of Fleming,
either had actual knowledge of the David's litigation and its signifi-
cance 92 or acted with reckless indifference to the significance of the liti-
gation; (2) that the defendants had an "affirmative duty" to stay informed
of any "potentially material litigation against the company" and a duty to
disclose such litigation to the public; and (3) that the defendants had ex-
plicitly disclosed pending litigation involving equivalent damage claims
while not disclosing the David's litigation. 93 The plaintiffs also noted that
several internal company memoranda supported their claim that the de-
fendants must have known of the Fleming pricing policies at the heart of
the David's lawsuit.94
The complaint gave five possible motives for the defendants not to
disclose the David's litigation, which the defendants allegedly knew to
be material: (1) to insure the success of notes offered for sale during the
class period; (2) to avoid hampering the success of the new "cost-plus"
sales marketing plan; (3) to avoid future, similar lawsuits; (4) to protect
their positions and reputations within the company; and (5) to increase
the value of their personal investments in Fleming stock.95 The trial court
found these allegations of scienter insufficient to meet the pleading re-
quirements of Rule lOb-5, and that they supported, at most, "a finding of
simple negligence., 96 The plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
97
2. Decision
Since this was the first case that required the Tenth Circuit to inter-
pret the scienter pleading requirements of the PSLRA, the court first re-
viewed the legislative history of the Act, and then examined other cir-
98cuits' interpretations of the PSLRA. The court agreed with the position
five other circuits took, and stated, "[P]laintiffs can adequately plead
scienter by setting forth facts raising a 'strong inference' of intentional or
89. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1251, 1253-54. Four days later, the jury assessed punitive damages,
increasing the damage award to "approximately $200 million plus attorney's fees and costs." Id. at
1251.
90. Id. at 1251-52.
91. See id. at 1252.
92. Several of the defendants had previously been deposed as part of the David's litigation.
See id. at 1255 & n.14.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 1256-57.
96. Id. at 1257.
97. Id. at 1248-49.
98. Id. at 1258-63.
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reckless misconduct." 99 The court enunciated a two-part test applicable
to allegations of nondisclosure of material facts. 1°° The plaintiff must
first show that "the defendant knew of the potentially material fact[(s)],"
and second, that the defendant knew that investors would likely be mis-
led by "the failure to reveal the potentially material fact[(s)]."' 0 ' The
court then explicitly stated its adoption of the "middle ground" standard
whereby "motive and opportunity pleadings are relevant to a finding of
scienter, but... do not constitute a separate, alternative method of plead-
ing scienter."'' 0 2 Courts in the Tenth Circuit must examine a plaintiffs'
allegations of scienter to see if, "taken as a whole," they support "a
strong inference of scienter.
°
103
The court reviewed the plaintiffs' complaint using this newly enun-
ciated standard and upheld the trial court's dismissal. 1 4 The court found
that the plaintiffs had failed to plead particular facts sufficient to infer
that the individual defendants knew of the David's litigation, or the rele-
vant business practices regarding "cost-plus" contracts, or even the po-
tential materiality of the lawsuit: "[T]he mere fact that the individual
Defendants occupied senior positions in the company, and that two of
them knew of the litigation at least by early 1995 is not sufficient to im-
ply knowledge of the specific fact of materiality."'10 5 Even if the court
accepted as true the plaintiff s allegations that the defendants knew of the
David's litigation, the court emphasized that knowledge of the underly-
ing facts does not establish scienter; rather, defendants must have actual
knowledge of the potentially harmful effects of misleading investors by
nondisclosure. °6 Alternatively, plaintiffs may plead facts that show that
it would be obvious to reasonable people that harm was likely. 0 7 The
court also rejected as merely conclusory the plaintiffs' claims that the
defendants acted with reckless disregard of the "true facts misrepresented
or omitted in Fleming's public statements and filings."' 0 8 The simple fact
that the defendants held senior positions in the company did not justify a
finding that they had actual knowledge of the facts: "Plaintiffs ... never
99. Id. at 1259.
100. Id. at 1261. See supra note 81, for the definition of "materiality."
101. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1261.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1263.
104. Id. at 1249.
105. Id. at 1264 (emphasis added). Commentators have faulted Fleming for possibly
"creat[ing] a more difficult barrier than other circuits in pleading state of mind." 3C HAROLD S.
BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAw § 16:37.1 (2d ed.
2002). They argue that the Tenth Circuit, in focusing on whether the defendants knew or should have
known of the materiality of the David's litigation, changed the yardstick of materiality into a subjec-
tive standard. Id.
106. See Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1264.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 1254-55.
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name any specific report defendants may have received or identify spe-
cific advice defendants may have given or received .... ,,109
The court next evaluated the plaintiffs' argument that the defendants
should have known, or actually knew, of the importance to investors of
the David's lawsuit because of the large damages claims and because it
had the potential to engender additional, similar lawsuits." 0 The plain-
tiffs had failed to provide financial data that would allow the court to
evaluate the percentage of Fleming's assets that were actually at risk in
the David's litigation.' 1' In addition, the plaintiffs failed to plead specific
facts as to other potential lawsuits, such as the number of customers or
volume attributable to the "cost-plus" contracts at issue.11 Without a
showing of additional threatened or pending lawsuits, the court found
that such suits were merely "potential risks."'' 3
Furthermore, even assuming that the defendants knew they might be
subjected to an adverse judgment in the David's litigation, the court
could not find the possibility of this event significant enough to consider
the defendants reckless for not disclosing the litigation.1 4 The court re-
ferred to various SEC reporting requirements relating to the materiality
of suits against a company, noting that it "could not impute knowledge of
the higher damage claims to Defendants ... and.. . [it] could not deter-
mine the potential materiality under [17 C.F.R.] § 229.103 ... because
Plaintiffs [did] not provide[] the [necessary] financial information."" 5
The court pointed to both the likelihood that plaintiffs seeking to force a
settlement would make inflated claims and the fact that Fleming dis-
closed the David's litigation within one month of the amended damages
claim requesting approximately $450 million as further indications that
the defendants did not act recklessly or negligently.''
6
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1264.
111. Id. at 1264-65.
112. Id. at 1265.
113. Id. at 1267.
114. Id. at 1265-66.
115. Id. at 1266. Instruction number two to 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 states: "No information need
be given with respect to any proceeding that involves primarily a claim for damages if the amount
involved, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed 10 percent of the current assets of the
registrant and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis." 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2003). Some have
criticized the Fleming Court's apparent acceptance of the SEC's reporting requirements as determi-
native of materiality. See 3C BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 105, § 16:37.1. By accepting the
10 percent current asset test, the court essentially foreclosed the plaintiffs' allegations that the defen-
dants should have disclosed the pending David's litigation. Id. Nevertheless, even if one takes the
position that the court should not have considered this SEC requirement, the plaintiffs still did not
provide facts supporting an inference that the defendants knew investors might be misled by nondis-
closure. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1264. The Tenth Circuit standard does not differ appreciably from that
of the other "middle ground" circuits. See discussion infra Part IV.
116. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1268.
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Of the five motives that the plaintiffs alleged," 7 the court concluded
that four represented "generalized motives shared by all companies" and,
as such, could not alone provide a strong inference of scienter. 1 18 In order
to support an assertion that a defendant had a motive predicated on a
desire to increase the value of stock holdings or otherwise profit from a
relationship with a company, a plaintiff must show that a defendant bene-
fited from insider trading or sold stock that the defendant held person-
ally.119 Here, however, the plaintiffs made no concrete showing of such
activities.1 20 Since all companies and executives presumably desire to
keep a high bond rating or stock price and to avoid potential lawsuits,
allegations of such motives alone "cannot ... sustain a claim of securi-
ties fraud."'
2'
The court agreed that the plaintiffs' second alleged motive, Flem-
ing' s desire to convert all of its customers to "cost-plus" contracts, might
have suffered harm if customers learned of the David's litigation.1
22
Nevertheless, because of the alleged history of customer complaints that
Fleming did not pass on discounts, the court found that disclosure of the
David's litigation would likely have had little impact on the success of
the "cost-plus" marketing plan. 23 Thus, Fleming's desire for the plan to
succeed could not provide a sufficient motive to demonstrate either reck-
lessness or intent to defraud. 24 The court concluded that the plaintiffs'
pleadings "taken as a whole" failed to provide, with enough particularity,
facts sufficient to support a "strong inference" that the defendants acted
with the necessary scienter. 125
B. Recent District Court Cases in the Tenth Circuit
Two recent decisions highlight the impact of Fleming on the plead-
ing of securities fraud complaints in the Tenth Circuit. 1
26
117. See supra text accompanying note 95.
118. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1269-70.
119. Id. at 1270.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1269-70.
122. Id. at 1268. The court noted that such a motive would not normally support an inference
of fraud because a "desire not to jeopardize a company's business plan is a motive shared by most
companies." Id. Here, however, the alleged motive was "specifically and directly related to the
underlying facts." Id.
123. Id. at 1269.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1270. Fleming now faces an "uncertain future." Ann Zimmerman, Fleming Has
Doubts About Financing, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2003, at B8, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3963305.
The SEC is investigating the company's accounting practices and one of its largest customers, Kmart
Corp., has ended its contract with Fleming. Id. News of Fleming's likely restatement of earnings
caused its stock to drop 46% on Friday, March 28, 2003, to 61 cents. Id. This was in addition to the
more than 90% loss in share value suffered over the previous year. See id.
126. Other cases also demonstrate the effect that Fleming has had. See In re Sprint Corp. Sec.
Litig., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1224-25 (D. Kan. 2002) (distinguishing Fleming and finding plaintiffs'
allegations of motive compelling where defendants stood to exercise $1.7 billion in stock options;
other motives as to optimistic statements failed to raise strong inference of scienter); Precision
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1. In re Sun Healthcare Group, Inc. Securities Litigation'
27
Plaintiffs claimed that Sun Healthcare Group, Inc. ("Sun"), a large
healthcare provider, made false representations in many public state-
ments and financial disclosures concerning its capacity to react to immi-
nent Medicare reimbursement decreases. 128 The plaintiffs alleged that
Sun should have known it could not combat the negative impact of the
new reimbursement schedule because of Sun's experiences in operating
nursing home facilities reimbursed under a similar payment regime.1
9
Sun experienced a marked decrease in its reimbursement revenues and
petitioned for bankruptcy in 1999.130
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the effects of the new reim-
bursement schedule, Sun claimed it would offset any negative effects
through its "early and intensive preparation[s]" for cost reductions and
through the efficiency of Sun's operating model. 3 ' Because Sun made
these allegedly misleading statements prior to the government actually
implementing the new payment arrangements, the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico viewed the plaintiffs' claims as
assertions of "fraud by hindsight"-a type of claim specifically disal-
lowed in Fleming.132 The court found that the "Defendants could not
possibly have known the transition's effect on the company with cer-
tainty before [the government's conversion to the new reimbursement
regime].' 33 In particular, the plaintiffs failed to provide any specific
evidence of possible financial harm to Sun that the defendants did not
disclose in their public statements. 34 The court faulted the plaintiffs for
not providing details that would allow the court to make a meaningful
comparison and to "discern Defendants' alleged scienter."1 35
The court also stated that it found "it particularly noteworthy that
[the plaintiffs] . .. utterly failed to present a logical motive for Defen-
Vascular Sys., Inc. v. Sarcos L.C., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1187 (D. Utah 2002) (finding a lack of
specific facts that would allow a strong inference of scienter in allegations of misrepresentations that
allegedly induced investors to transfer five million shares to an affiliated corporation); Pirraglia v.
Novell, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (D. Utah 2002) (dismissing a complaint alleging that defendants
issued materially false financial statements and business performance and prospect statements due to
the lack of particularity and failure to allege requisite scienter); Gower v. IKON Office Solutions,
Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1232 (D. Kan. 2001) (citing Fleming for rules on the sufficiency of
evidence to satisfy the scienter requirement in state wrongful discharge and breach of contract suit).
127. 181 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (D. N.M. 2002).
128. Sun Healthcare, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1286. Passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
spurred the Health Care Financing Administration to issue new reimbursement rates for Medicare
services. Id. at 1285.
129. Id. at 1295-96.
130. Id. at 1286.
131. See id. at 1295.
132. Id. (quoting Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1260).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1296.
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dants' alleged fraud."'136 The court rejected as "baseless" the plaintiffs'
allegations that the defendants were motivated by insider trading and by
Sun's desire to successfully acquire another company as a subsidiary.
7
The plaintiffs provided no facts to support an inference that insiders had
engaged in "unusual" stock activity. 38In addition, the court found the
second motive totally illogical because it wondered why the defendants
would seek to acquire a company that would only cause Sun to suffer
increased losses under the new payment schedule. 39 Thus, the plaintiffs
failed to establish Sun's motive to commit the alleged fraud.'" Finally,
relying on Fleming, the court also viewed the plaintiffs' allegations that
the defendants violated GAAP, without more, as insufficient to support
their claims that the defendants intended to mislead investors.141
2. Spiegel v. Tenfold Corp. 1
42
Tenfold Corporation ("Tenfold") and several of its directors alleg-
edly published materially false statements regarding Tenfold's ability to
perform certain of its contractual obligations. 4 3 These statements in-
cluded repeated "on time guarantees" while the defendants knew that the
company had missed several similar previous deadlines,'" along with
knowing misstatements of Tenfold's technological capabilities. 4 Also,
the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants improperly recognized revenues
in violation of GAAP.146 The complaint asserted that the defendants
knew or should have known of the company's inability to successfully
meet its obligations, and further, that the defendants must have known
that their statements would likely mislead investors. 1
47
The United States District Court for the District of Utah faulted the
complaint for not providing facts that would allow an inference that the
defendants had actual knowledge of the company's inability to per-
form. 48 Nor did the complaint show that the defendants knew that the
statements "posed a substantial likelihood of misleading a reasonable
investor in light of the total mix of information." 149 The court applied
Fleming's "totality of the pleadings" test to find that the complaint,
viewed "as a whole," failed "to give rise to a strong inference... [of] the
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995)).
139. Id. at 1296-97.
140. Id. at 1297.
141. Id.
142. 192 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (D. Utah 2002).
143. Spiegel, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
144. Id. at 1264.
145. Id. at 1267.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1265.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1265).
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requisite mental state."'' 50 Also, as in Sun Healthcare,151 the court noted
that the plaintiffs' allegations of accounting irregularities, without more,
did not create the necessary strong inference of scienter.
1 2
I. SCIENTER IN OTHER CIRCUITS
As discussed in Part I, several circuits had already addressed the
PSLRA's scienter requirement prior to the Tenth Circuit's Fleming deci-
sion.153 In order to facilitate the comparison given in Part IV between the
different circuits' views of the requirements for pleading scienter, this
section presents recent cases from the First, Second, and Ninth Cir-
cuits--circuits that had already expressed their opinions. This section
will also briefly review the positions presently taken by the Fourth, Fifth,
and Eighth Circuits. 1
54
A. First Circuit: Aldridge v. A.T. Cross Corp.
155
1. Facts
The A.T. Cross Corporation ("Cross"), a maker of writing utensils,
began selling a new product line in early 1998.156 Cross had "high hopes"
for its personal electronic devices, the CrossPad and CrossPad XP, hav-
ing publicly stated in September 1997 that it expected at least "$25 mil-
lion in profitable sales."' 157 Instead, Cross suffered a $24.3 million loss in
1999 and subsequently discontinued sales of its pen-based computing
products. 1
58
Aldridge, a shareholder, filed a putative class action in April 2000
on behalf of people who purchased stock in Cross during the class pe-
riod, September 17, 1997, to April 22, 1999.159 Aldridge specifically
alleged that Cross employed various sales strategies including "channel
em60ye sae1taeie nldn 162
stuffing,"' take backs,' 61 and extending price protection to retailers.
Aldridge contended that these practices affected the company's reported
150. Id. at 1266.
151. Sun Healthcare, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
152. Id. at 1267 (quoting Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1261).
153. See discussion supra Part I.C.
154. See Annual Review of Federal Securities Regulation, 58 Bus. LAW. 747, 820-89 (2003)
[hereinafter Annual Review], for a review and analysis of recent PSLRA-related cases.
155. 284 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2002).




160. Id. at 81 ("'Channel stuffing' means inducing purchasers to increase substantially their
purchases before they would, in the normal course, otherwise purchase products from the company.
It has the result of shifting earnings into earlier quarters, quite likely to the detriment of earnings in
later quarters." (quoting Greebel v. FrP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 202 (1st Cir. 1999))).
161. Id. ("A 'take back' is a promise to take back goods from customers who have been unable
to sell them.").
162. Id. at 80 ("Price protection is a retailer's or distributor's right to reimbursement in the
event of post-sale price reductions.").
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sales of CrossPads and, thus, constituted material information 63 that
Cross failed to disclose to investors despite its obligation to do so.1
64
Also, in light of these sales tactics and resulting accounting practices,
Aldridge alleged that Cross's management made certain fraudulent and
misleading statements. 65 In the period from September 1997 to June
1988, Cross made various optimistic statements in press releases, in its
10-K report with the SEC, in Barron's, and in Value Line that sales of
the CrossPad would significantly add to the company's profitability.'
66
Aldridge contended that subsequent statements by company officials in
1999 showed that Cross had in fact offered its customers price protection
as early as 1998.167 In a February article in the Providence Journal, a
company official claimed that the February 1999 price cut of up to 30%
in CrossPad products had been planned from the "get go" and that retail-
ers were aware of these planned price reductions. 68 Company officials
also seemed to indicate in a conference call with investors and analysts
on April 22, 1999, that the price protection program was part of the com-
pany's original strategy.169 The district court dismissed Aldridge's
claims, finding no support for the allegations that the defendants know-
ingly made misleading statements. 70
2. Decision
The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's dis-
missal, holding that Aldridge had sufficiently supported his allegations of
fraud, and that his pleadings allowed a strong inference that Cross and its
management "consciously intended to defraud, or ... acted with a high
degree of recklessness," when making the allegedly false statements.1
71
Three facts and circumstances alleged in the complaint, taken together,
established a strong inference of scienter: (1) evidence indicated that the
Defendants knowingly published arguably inaccurate or misleading
statements regarding Cross's price protection and take back policies; (2)
evidence showed that Cross did not properly account for the contingent
nature of sales in company reports and financial statements; and
(3) Cross's corporate officers had particular financial incentives to exag-
gerate earnings that were different from other firms' standard corporate
compensation methods.172 The court emphasized that the PSLRA did not
change the standard of review for a motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), and "[t]he district court did not 'giv[e] plaintiff[] the
163. Id. at 82. See supra note 81, for the definition of "materiality."
164. Aldridge, 284 F.3d. at 77.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 76.
167. See id. at 79.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 80.
170. Id. at 77.
171. See id. at 82 (citing Greebel, 194 F.3d at 198-201).
172. See id. at 82-84.
[Vol. 80:3
SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION
benefit of all reasonable inferences' as it should have on a motion to
dismiss."'
173
B. Second Circuit: In re Scholastic Corp. Securities Litigation
74
1. Facts
In December 1996, Scholastic Corporation ("Scholastic"), a book
publisher and distributor, changed its sales strategy by expanding distri-
bution of its best-selling product, the "Goosebumps" series of children's
books, to include mass merchandisers. 175 Scholastic publicly described
this expansion of distribution "as a significant positive development."'
176
The complaint alleged that Scholastic did not communicate to investors
that sales of Goosebumps significantly decreased in the fall of 1996, and
that Scholastic afforded retailers and distributors a full right of return. 1
77
In December 1996, Scholastic announced a 24% increase in net
second quarter income over the previous year.178 While Scholastic had
earlier expressed "comfort" with security analysts' third quarter income
estimates of 64 to 73 cents per share, Scholastic announced an expected
third quarter loss of 70 to 80 cents per share in February 1997.179 Scho-
lastic then announced that it "would take a $13 million pre-tax special
charge" to create "a reserve for anticipated additional book returns,"
which triggered an immediate 40% decline in Scholastic's stock price. 180
The plaintiffs alleged that one of Scholastic's vice presidents, de-
fendant Raymond Marchuk, had a motive to influence Scholastic's dis-
semination of false and misleading statements in order to keep the price
of Scholastic stock high, since he realized $1.25 million from the sale of
his personal stock.' 81 The plaintiffs also identified several other purport-
edly false and misleading material statements made to securities analysts
and published in a supplement to a company prospectus.
82
2. Decision
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiffs
had alleged facts in sufficient detail to support an inference that the de-
fendants knew of the potentially material sales declines, and next turned
to the plaintiffs' allegations of scienter. 183 Since the complaint listed only
173. Id. at 78-79 (alterations in original) (quoting Greebel, 194 F.3d at 201).
174. 252 F.3d 63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1071 (2001).
175. Scholastic, 252 F.3d. at 68.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 68-69.
178. Id. at 68.
179. Id. at 68-69.
180. Id. at 69.
181. Id. at 74.
182. Id. at 70.
183. Id. at 70-74.
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one individual defendant, Marchuk, the court considered motive with
respect to Marchuk alone and did not examine whether other Scholastic
officers had sold any stock during the class period.' 84 The complaint al-
leged that Marchuck had not sold any Scholastic shares since 1995, yet
starting in late 1996, he "sold [80%] of his holdings within a matter of
days for a not insignificant profit."' 185 Because of his access to private
company information, Marchuk was in a position to manipulate the re-
lease of information to the public.' 86 Thus, the plaintiffs sufficiently pled
motive and opportunity to commit fraud. 1
87
The court also found that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that
the defendants had knowledge of information that contradicted their pub-
lic statements such as to constitute "an extreme departure from the stan-
dards of ordinary care" and allow an inference that the defendants exhib-
ited conscious misbehavior or recklessness. 88 In particular, the plaintiffs
pled that the defendant (1) knew investors relied on information pertain-
ing to sales and returns of Goosebumps books; (2) publicly represented,
contrary to Scholastic's own data, "that returns were not increasing;"
(3) told stock analysts that returns remained at normal levels;
(4) disregarded retailers' warnings that "the newer Goosebump books
were too 'scary;"' and (5) failed to follow Scholastic's own announced
policy regarding book return accounting procedures.
189
C. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit has not yet ruled on the new pleading standards
of the PSLRA, 19° but it appears from various dicta that the court would
likely agree with the middle ground courts. In Phillips v. LCI Interna-
tional, Inc.,' 91 the court discussed the other circuits' PSLRA strong infer-
ence standards, but found that it did not have to select a standard because
the plaintiffs in that case had failed to meet even what it characterized as
the "most lenient standard possible under the PSLRA, the two-pronged
Second Circuit test."'' 92 More recently, in In re Trex Co. Securities
Litigation,193 one district court within the Fourth Circuit stated that it was
persuaded by reasoning that "reject[s] the mechanical application of any
judicial test, ' 194 and instead applied a "totality of the circumstances" test
to decide whether allegations supported a "cogent and persuasive . . .
184. Id. at 75.
185. Id. at 69, 75.
186. Id. at 75-76.
187. Id. at 76.
188. See id. (quoting Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978)).
189. See id. at 76-77.
190. Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 621 (4th Cir. 1999).
191. 190 F.3d 609.
192. Id. at 620-21.
193. 212 F. Supp. 2d 596 (W.D. Va. 2002).
194. Trex, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 607 n.7.
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inference" of scienter.195 In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that several
officers of a manufacturer of non-wood decking material sought to in-
crease their year-end bonuses by issuing misleading sales statements and
engaging in channel stuffing.196 The court cited Fleming, among other
cases, for the proposition that motivations common to company officials
do not substantiate motive for securities fraud. 197 It also distinguished the
facts before it regarding channel stuffing from those in Aldridge because
the plaintiffs did not make specific allegations that would show how the
purported sales practice affected revenues and, thus, the officers' bo-
nuses. 198
D. Fifth Circuit
Shortly after the Tenth Circuit decided Fleming, the Fifth Circuit
addressed the PSLRA pleading requirements. 99 The court agreed with
other circuits that "[iut seems clear . . . the PSLRA has not generally al-
tered the substantive scienter requirement ... and therefore severe reck-
lessness ... remains a basis for such liability. 200 Pointing out that "[t]he
PSLRA neither mandated nor prohibited any particular method of estab-
lishing a strong inference of scienter, ''20 1 the court cited with approval the
approach taken by the Sixth Circuit in Comshare.20 2 Most importantly,
the court stated: "What must be alleged is not motive and opportunity as
such but particularized facts," but "[aippropriate allegations of motive




The Eighth Circuit "[v]iew[s] [a plaintiff's] ... complaint to deter-
mine whether [the plaintiff] set forth facts that give a strong reason to
believe there was reckless or intentional wrongdoing," yet it does not
impose any particular criteria or method for meeting this standard. 204 In
Florida State Board of Administration v. Green Tree Financial Corp. ,205
195. Id. (quoting In re MicroStrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp. 2d 620, 633-34 (E.D. Va.
2000)).
196. See id. at 599-600.
197. Id. at 607-08 (citing City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1268-70 (10th
Cir. 2001)).
198. See id. at 608-12.
199. Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001) (allowing allegations of false
and misleading statements regarding extent of company's patent coverage to support a strong infer-
ence of scienter but cautioning that they might be "barely" sufficient).
200. Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 408.
201. Id. at 411.
202. Id. at 410 ("The most sensible approach [to pleading a strong inference of scienter] ap-
pears to us to be the one first generally articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Comshare.").
203. Id. at 412.
204. In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 745 (8th Cir.), vacated by 2002 WL
1760770 (8th Cir. July 31, 2002).
205. 270 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding a heightened showing of motive to commit fraud
where the magnitude and timing of an executive's compensation was unusual, and that a strong
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the court stated that sufficient complaints typically include a showing of
"unusual or heightened" motive, and a plaintiff's showing of motive and
opportunity can support a belief that a defendant made knowing or reck-
less misrepresentations.2 6 If a complaint makes neither of these show-
ings, then it must include other particularly strong allegations in order for
the court to infer scienter. 1°7
F. Does the Ninth Circuit Stand Alone? Lipton v. PathoGenesis Corp.
20 8
1. Facts
PathoGenesis Corporation ("PathoGenesis") developed TOBI (to-
bramycin solution for inhalation), an inhaled antibiotic used to treat cys-
tic fibrosis.2°9 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration granted Patho-
Genesis approval to market TOBI in December 1997.21 ° After one year
of sales to wholesalers and mail-order pharmacies, PathoGenesis an-
nounced a 7% price increase, but told its wholesalers, in a letter, that
"they could purchase TOBI at the lower pre-increase price during a two-
week 'buy-in' period.",21' The "buy-in" period began December 11, 1998,
and generated a large volume of sales, which gave rise to a strong fourth
quarter with sales of $17.8 million.21 2 These fourth quarter sales repre-
sented a 20% growth from the previous quarter, and corporate statements
allegedly led investors to expect increased sales of TOBI during the first
quarter of 1999.213 Instead, PathoGenesis announced near the end of the
214first quarter of 1999 that TOBI sales would be closer to $10 million.
Since sales of TOBI accounted for almost 98% of PathoGenesis' annual
sales, value of its stock dropped sharply. 1 5 The plaintiffs brought a secu-
rities fraud suit on behalf of all purchasers of PathoGenesis stock during
the class period of January 15, 1989, to March 22, 1999.16
The plaintiffs claimed that PathoGenesis sought to create an impres-
sion of increasing patient demand for TOBI, specifically listing three
allegedly false or misleading statements made by the company or its of-
ficers. 21 The plaintiffs further alleged that in December 1998, Patho-
inference of scienter was supported when the facts pled showed knowledge of or access to informa-
tion contradicting public statements).
206. Green Tree, 270 F.3d at 660.
207. Id. The Eighth Circuit recently reinforced these holdings in In re K-Tel International, Inc.
Securities Litigation, 300 F.3d 881, 893 (8th Cir. 2002), where it confirmed that general allegations
of GAAP violations are insufficient to support scienter as are motives common to corporations or
corporate officers.
208. 284 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2002).
209. PathoGenesis, 284 F.3d at 1030.
210. Id. at 1031.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 1031-32.
214. Id. at 1031.
215. See id. at 1031 & n.2.




Genesis knew that demand for TOBI had leveled and developed the
"buy-in" program to artificially boost fourth quarter sales. 218 PathoGene-
sis purportedly wanted to show strong sales because it sought to expand
foreign distribution and needed to obtain favorable financing arrange-
ments.219 Finally, the plaintiffs pointed to two stock sales made by
PathoGenesis' Chairman and C.E.O. during the class period as another
motive to mislead investors. 220 The district court judge dismissed the
complaint, holding, in part, that the "plaintiffs had not pleaded detailed
and particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter."
221
2. Decision
Because the plaintiffs failed to identify any internal company
documents or reports that showed a decline in sales of TOBI, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals could not infer that PathoGenesis officers had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of flat or declining patient de-
mand.222 The court explained that the plaintiffs needed to provide spe-
cific references to the contents of any reports purportedly utilized by the
defendants in order to support their allegations that the company had
consciously made misleading representations.223 The court also dis-
224counted the insider stock transactions as not probative of scienter.
Here, the court noted that (1) the sales constituted a small percentage of
the Chairman's holdings; (2) the timing of the sales, even considering
that they followed announcement of positive earnings, was not suspi-
cious; and (3) no other insiders sold stock during this period. 22 Further-
more, the court characterized the allegations that PathoGenesis sought to
conceal knowledge of moderating patient demand while seeking a line of
credit and increased foreign sales as "ordinary and appropriate corporate
business objectives., 226 Without more, the court could not consider such
227motives fraudulent. Finally, the court considered whether, even though
individually insufficient, the allegations taken as a whole could give rise
228to a strong inference of conscious or deliberate recklessness. Because
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1032. The CEO sold 10,000 personally held shares within two weeks of the com-
pany's fourth quarter earnings announcement. See id. Prior to this time, he had not sold any of his
PathoGenesis stock. Id. The complaint further alleged that the CEO had planned to sell up to 50,000
shares. Id.
221. Id. at 1034.
222. Id. at 1035-36 (citing In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir.
1999)).
223. See id.
224. Id. at 1036-38.
225. See id. at 1037. The 10,000 shares represented only 1.4% of the CEO's holdings. Id.
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of what it viewed as a lack of critical details and particularized facts, the
court affirmed the lower court's dismissal . 29
IV. ANALYSIS
As circuit courts have considered the issue, a common standard is
emerging. 230
A. Commonality of the Middle Ground
The First, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, Eleventh, and arguably the Fourth and
Eighth Circuits appear to share a common "middle ground" 231 approach
in their analysis of the PSLRA's heightened pleading of scienter. These
courts view plaintiffs' claims in their "entirety" to determine whether the
232allegations "taken as a whole" compel a strong inference of scienter.
They place emphasis on three factors when addressing the sufficiency of
the pleading of scienter.
First, plaintiffs must support allegations that defendants made, or
failed to make, statements of material fact with fact-based reasons that
233the statements were misleading at the time they were made. General
claims such as allegations of misleading sales practices or GAAP or
other accounting violations will not suffice.234 Second, plaintiffs must
provide particular facts that constitute compelling circumstantial evi-
dence of defendants' knowing or reckless misbehavior.235 Plaintiffs can-
not make claims characterized as "fraud-by-hindsight. ', 236 Third, while
motive and opportunity are important considerations, generalized allega-
tions of motive common to many corporations or corporate officers will
not prevail. 7 In addition, since a court will evaluate each securities
fraud case based on its specific facts, plaintiffs cannot rely on a magic
pleading formula.238
229. Id.
230. Gerard Pecht & Glen Banks, Standard for Scienter, NAT'LL.J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A19; see
also Karmel, supra note 53 ("[T]he gap in interpretations of PSLRA in the circuits has been narrow-
ing.").
231. City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1261 (10th Cir. 2001).
232. See Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1263.
233. See id. at 1260.
234. See id. at 1261.
235. See id. at 1260.
236. See id. (quoting Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 2000)).
237. See id. at 1262.
238. See Jeffrey A. Berens, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, 31 COLO. LAW. 39, 43 (2002) ("[A] case specific analysis is always necessary"). See
generally S. Michael Pack, Jr., Securities Law- Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos.: Determining Pleading
Standards in Securities Fraud Case Under the PSLRA, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 671 (2002) (dis-
cussing the Tenth Circuit's analysis of the PSLRA pleading standard).
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B. An Emerging Consensus
1. What is "Deliberate Recklessness?"
When the Ninth Circuit first announced its interpretation of the
PSLRA pleading requirements in In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities
239Litigation, commentators and other courts viewed the holding as
evincing a particularly stringent and unique take on the scienter stan-
dard.24 Many understood the court's "deliberate recklessness" as implic-
241itly changing the substantive level of proof needed to show scienter.
Additionally, critics took issue with the court's seemingly categorical
denial of the sufficiency of motive and opportunity to support allegations
242of scienter.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has retreated from this so-called ex-
treme interpretation in recent cases and there may very well be less to
these perceived changes to the standard than commentators have argued.
The Ninth Circuit's "deliberate recklessness" standard is arguably essen-
tially the same as the Sixth Circuit's "akin to conscious disregard, 243
which both the First and Eleventh Circuits adopted. 2" Similarly, it is
difficult to discern where the Tenth Circuit's "extreme departure from
the standards of ordinary care ... known to the defendant'"2 45 test would
lead to a different result than the Ninth Circuit's test.
Interestingly, in both Lipton v. PathoGenesis Corp., and in another
Ninth Circuit case, Gompper v. VISX, Inc.,246 the Ninth Circuit appeared
to downplay any differences between its interpretation of the PSLRA and
that of its sister circuits. In particular, the court emphasized the need to
view a complaint in its "entirety," directing district courts to apply a bal-
ancing test in considering an allegation, "together with any reasonable
inferences. 2 47 Thus, it would seem that the Ninth Circuit views motive
and opportunity as useful indicators for ascertaining a defendant's intent.
239. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir. 1999).
240. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 33, at 1316-19 ("In addition to forming a new and uncertain
standard of scienter under the PSLRA, the Ninth Circuit established a seemingly impossible barrier
to private individuals bringing a securities fraud claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5.").
241. See id. at 1317-18.
242. See, e.g., Guido, supra note 20, at 534-46.
243. In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 1999).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 65-78.
245. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1258.
246. 298 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2002). The plaintiffs in Gompper alleged that VISX, a maker of
laser vision-correction devices, knew, or should have known, that its patents were invalid. Gompper,
298 F.3d at 895. The complaint further alleged that the defendants' optimistic growth and earnings
statements were thus recklessly or intentionally misleading. Id. The circuit court concluded that the
plaintiffs had failed to plead facts showing that the defendants had knowledge, at the time the state-
ments were made, of the likelihood of the patents' invalidity. Id. at 896.
247. Id. at 897. But see Annual Review, supra note 154, at 844 (stating that one aspect of the
First Circuit's analysis in Aldridge was "almost directly contrary to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Gompper").
20031
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
2. Are the Second and Third Circuits Less Strict?
Though both the Second Circuit, in Press v. Chemical Investment
Services Corp. ,248 and the Third Circuit, in In re Advanta Securities Liti-
gation,249 held that allegations of motive and'opportunity alone may es-
tablish scienter, subsequent cases suggest otherwise. Cases that have
survived a motion to dismiss have had further elements constituting
250strong evidence of conscious behavior or recklessness. In Novak v.
Kasaks, the Second Circuit emphasized that plaintiffs must allege with
sufficient particularity the facts that support their claim. 251 In another
Second Circuit case, In re Scholastic Corp. Securities Litigation,252 the
court determined that those Plaintiffs had adequately pled both motive
and opportunity and conscious misbehavior.2 5  The allegations in the
Scholastic pleadings likely would also be sufficient under Fleming's
"taken as a whole" test.
25 4
Despite their rhetoric, the Second and Third Circuits actually apply
a fact-specific "taken as a whole" test. As in the Tenth Circuit, not all
motives matter. Certain motives are more indicative of scienter than are
others. Plaintiffs must supplement or support the "opportunity" portion




All of the circuits that have addressed the issue have incorporated
the "strong inference" requirement in scienter pleading mandated by the
PSLRA. Irrespective of the exact details of the pleading standard they
claim to have adopted, the preceding anlaysis shows the courts apply
some form of heightened scrutiny test to allegations of scienter in plead-
ings under Rule lOb-5. None of these tests appears to differ in any sub-
stantial way from that used by the Tenth Circuit in Fleming.256
248. 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999).
249. 180 F.3d 525, 534-35 (3d Cir. 1999).
250. See Ann Morales Olazabal, The Search for "Middle Ground:" Towards a Harmonized
Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's New Pleading Standard, 6 STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FIN. 153, 167-74 (2001).
251. Novak, 216F.3dat311.
252. 252 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2001).
253. Scholastic, 252 F.3d at 76.
254. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1263.
255. See id. at 1261-63.
256. Many commentators have argued that the Supreme Court needs to resolve what these
commentators see as a circuit split. See Guido, supra note 20, at 502; Erin Brady, Comment, Deter-
mining the Proper Pleading Standard Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
After In re Silicon Graphics, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 471, 510-12 (2001); Karmel, supra note 53 (speculat-
ing that the Supreme Court would likely maintain severe or deliberate recklessness as a basis for
scienter); David E. Rovella, Securities Reform Spawns Discord, NAT'L L.J., July 23, 2001, at Al.
The Eighth Circuit noted that the split may be "more apparent than real." Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v.
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 659 (8th Cir. 2001). Some differences still exist between the




1. Criticism of the Scienter Pleading Requirement
The dissent in a recent Eighth Circuit case articulated a major point
of contention257 that applies to the approaches of all the circuits. The
dissent disagreed with the majority's application of its scienter standard
because "[m]any relevant facts in securities cases may not be discover-
able at the pleading stage because they are known only by key insid-
ers. ' 258 Even though the PSLRA strengthened pleading standards, "it
does not require that a case be proven in the complaint. ' 259 This prob-
lematic requirement that plaintiffs provide particular facts in their com-
plaints, however, should not be attributed to the PSLRA's scienter stan-
dard. The heightened scienter standard arguably deters poorly pled, boi-
lerplate complaints and forces plaintiffs to present and factually-support
a cogent and well thought out argument in their pleadings. Because of
this deterrence, even should Congress choose to revisit the PSLRA, it
appears doubtful that Congress will revise the scienter requirement. It
seems more likely that Congress might change other PSLRA provisions,
such as the mandatory stay of discovery, or possibly include some type
of fee-shifting mechanism in an effort to further discourage unfounded
securities fraud suits. 260
2. Indicators of Fraud
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs' counsel must put
together a detailed and highly specific recitation of facts in the pleadings
that support a strong inference that a defendant had both motive and op-
portunity, as well as indicia of either conscious behavior or recklessness.
The following factors represent some of the strongest indicators of poten-
tial fraud: (1) sudden, large drops in stock price; (2) suspicious restate-
ments of revenue, announcements about financial irregularities, or
changes in, or replacement of, management or accounting firms;
(3) unusual insider trading or executive compensation strongly impacted
amount and kind of factual detail required at the pleading stage. However, the Supreme Court may
agree with the Eighth Circuit because it has, to date, declined to address these perceived discrepan-
cies. See In re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1071
(2001); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 122 S. Ct.
2616 (2002); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 (2000).
257. See In re K-Tel Int'l, Inc., Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881, 900 (8th Cir. 2002) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
258. K-Tel, 300 F.3d at 900 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
259. Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting); see Wilson, supra note 41, at 334-36 (arguing that the
PSLRA does not contain a provision that controls motions for summary judgment and that in the
Ninth Circuit, if a plaintiff manages to survive a motion to dismiss, he is very likely to have substan-
tially proven his case).
260. See Lyle Roberts, Reforming Litigation Reform Act Bush Should Back Fee-Shifting Plan
that Targets Meritless Class Actions, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Feb. 8, 2001, at 7 ("Plaintiffs
law firms appear to be offsetting the effect of having a higher percentage of their cases dismissed
under the Reform Act's stricter pleading standards by filing more cases.").
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When the Tenth Circuit decided City of Philadelphia v. Fleming
Cos.,262 a case of first impression in the circuit, the court made its stance
on the PSLRA's heightened pleading of scienter quite clear. Since the
court joined the other "middle ground" circuits, plaintiffs in the Tenth
Circuit cannot plead motive and opportunity alone.26 3 The court categori-
cally held that allegations of motives attributable to most companies or
corporate officers are not sufficient.264 To survive a motion to dismiss, a
plaintiffs allegations, "taken as a whole" and in the context of the total-
ity of the pleadings, must support a strong inference of scienter.265 This
"totality" of the pleadings test requires a highly individualized and fact-
specific analysis.
Plaintiffs' attorneys practicing within the Tenth Circuit jurisdiction
must endeavor to structure the totality of their pleadings so as to tell a
compelling story that will convince the court that hears the case that the
defendants likely perpetrated fraud. Most importantly, the plaintiffs must
provide persuasive factual support for their allegations. On the other
hand, defendants' attorneys, in a motion to dismiss, should focus on any
factual weaknesses, inadequacies, or lack of support in plaintiffs' plead-
ings. A defendant's attorney should explore any opportunity to character-
ize those pleadings as merely conclusory. Because the circuits employ
similar tests, attorneys should carefully scrutinize relevant court deci-
sions from all circuits.
Charles F. Hart*
261. Sherrie R. Savett, Securities Class Actions Since the 1995 Reform Act: A Plaintiffs Per-
spective, SG091 ALI-ABA 459, 491-97 (2002). See Elliot J. Weiss, Complex Litigation at the Mil-
lennium: Pleading Securities Fraud, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2001), for a cogent analysis of
the requirements for pleading a strong inference of scienter.
262. 264 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2001).
263. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1262-63.
264. Id. at 1269.
265. Id. at 1261-63.
266. See id. at 1263.
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Denver College of Law.
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